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Should a young girl fall pregnant under the practice of ukuthwala, the 
abduction for marriage of young girls,[1] and is denied an abortion by 
the hospital services when she is >20 weeks pregnant, the following 
issues must be considered: (i) What does the Constitution[2] say about 
healthcare and reproductive health for children?; (ii)  Does  ukuth-
wala violate the Constitution?; (iii) Does ukuthwala violate the Sexual 
Offences Act[3] and the Children’s Act?;[4] and (iv) Do the restrictive 
third-trimester grounds for termination of pregnancy under the 
Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act[5] violate the constitutional 
rights of children? 
The Constitution, healthcare and 
reproductive healthcare for children 
The Constitution[2] provides that every child has the right to basic 
healthcare services, unlike adults, who only have the right of access 
to healthcare services, including reproductive healthcare. Therefore, 
while the State must make healthcare available in its facilities, adult 
patients must find their own way there. However, for children who 
are not in the care of their parents, the State must assist them to 
reach the relevant healthcare facility.[6] Such children ‘… have a direct 
and immediate claim on the State for the fulfilment of their socio-
economic rights’.[7]
The Constitution does not mention healthcare services that include 
reproductive healthcare, as is the case with the general right of access 
to healthcare. However, the Constitution was not intended to provide 
children with lesser healthcare services than adults and should not be 
interpreted restrictively. The Constitutional Court has held that the 
constitutional provisions dealing specifically with children’s rights 
do not limit their other rights in the Constitution,[8] which states 
that ‘a child’s best interests are of paramount importance in every 
matter concerning the child’. Therefore, if the pregnancy of a child 
is likely to cause her severe psychological or physical injury but does 
not threaten her life, her request for a termination of pregnancy in 
the third trimester should be regarded as requiring ‘basic healthcare’. 
Children’s rights, as for everyone else, may only be limited if this is 
reasonable and justifiable as provided for in the Constitution.[9] 
Does the cultural practice of 
ukuthwala violate the Constitution?
The practice of ukuthwala has been described as a ‘mock abduction’ 
or an ‘irregular proposal’ to achieve a customary law marriage.[1] 
However, it has caused widespread abuse of children. In 2009, it was 
reported that in the Eastern Cape Province, under the pretext of the 
customary practice of ukuthwala, young girls were abducted, some 
with the consent of their parents, and compelled to leave school to 
‘marry’ older men. Some men were HIV-positive and wanted to be 
‘cured’ by having sex with a virgin. Many of the girls were infected 
with HIV and impregnated at an early age. They were also denied 
their other rights under the Constitution,[2] such as being detained 
against their will in guarded huts and forced to have sex with their 
‘husbands’, or being beaten and humiliated when trying to escape.[10] 
The Constitution[2] provides that everyone may participate in the 
cultural life of their choice but not in a manner inconsistent with any 
provision of the Constitution. Thus, ukuthwala may only be practised 
and enjoyed if not in conflict with the Constitution. However, 
judging from these reports, it violates many of the constitutional 
rights of young abducted girls and contravenes the general provision 
that the ‘child’s best interests are of paramount importance’. The 
constitutional rights of young girls violated by the practice of 
ukuthwala have been described and include: (i) equality, and not to be 
unfairly discriminated against; (ii) dignity, and to have their dignity 
respected and protected; (iii) freedom and security of the person; 
(iv) bodily and psychological integrity and security and control 
over their bodies, including the right to make decisions concerning 
reproduction; (v) not to be subjected to slavery, servitude or forced 
labour; and (vi) to live in an environment that is not harmful to their 
health or well-being, and the right to basic education.[10]
Does the practice of ukuthwala violate 
the Sexual Offences Act and the 
Children’s Act?
The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment 
Act[3] (Sexual Offences Act) repealed the common law offences of 
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rape and indecent assault and replaced these with a new definition 
of rape, consisting of sexual penetration of a person without their 
consent. The Act also created the new offences of sexual assault and 
sexual exploitation of children. The practice of ukuthwala violates 
all these provisions. Individuals, such as doctors who have treated 
victims of sexual abuse, have a duty to report it to the authorities. 
Failure to report may only be justified by a doctor on very limited 
grounds, e.g. that it was not in the ‘best interests’ of the child,[11] 
although this has not yet been tested in the courts. 
The practice of ukuthwala violates the principle of the best 
interests of the child. Although the principle is not explained in 
the Constitution, the factors influencing it are referred to in the 
Children’s Act,[4] which provides useful guidelines for healthcare 
practitioners to make decisions based on the best interests of the 
child. The Act provides that when determining the best interests of 
the child the following factors should be taken into account: (i) the 
nature of the relationship between ‘the child and any other care-
giver or person relevant in those circumstances’; (ii) the child’s age, 
maturity and stage of development, gender, background and any 
other relevant characteristic of the child; (iii) the child’s physical 
and emotional security and his or her intellectual, emotional, 
social and cultural development; (iv) the need to protect children 
from any physical or psychological harm that may be caused by 
subjecting them to maltreatment, abuse, neglect, exploitation or 
degradation, or exposing them to violence or exploitation or other 
harmful behaviour; and (v) deciding which action would avoid or 
minimise further legal or administrative proceedings in relation to 
the child.[4] Similar duties of reporting, such as those in the Sexual 
Offences Act,[3] exist under the Children’s Act,[4] which also require 
child sexual abuse to be reported. The last factor regarding avoiding 
or minimising legal or administrative proceedings may have some 
bearing in determining whether or not it is in the best interests of the 
child to report the sexual abuse. 
Do the restrictive third-trimester 
grounds for termination of pregnancy 
under the Choice on Termination 
of Pregnancy Act violate the 
constitutional rights of children?
Purpose of the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act
The Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act[5] (Choice Act) 
‘repeals the restrictive and inaccessible provisions of the Abortion 
and Sterilization Act, … promotes reproductive rights and extends 
freedom of choice by affording every woman the right to choose 
whether to have an early, safe and legal termination of pregnancy 
according to her individual beliefs’. Therefore, one must consider 
the following: (i) whether the third-trimester provisions of the 
Choice Act are less restrictive than those in the repealed Abortion 
and Sterilization Act[12] (Abortion Act); and (ii) whether the Choice 
Act provisions make termination of pregnancy more accessible than 
under the repealed Act. If the Choice Act is more restrictive and 
makes terminations less accessible in the third trimester because 
they exclude women who have been subjected to rape or incest 
from having an abortion after the 20th week of gestation, are these 
provisions unconstitutional?[13] 
Grounds for termination of pregnancy during the second 
and third trimesters under the Choice on Termination of 
Pregnancy Act
The Choice Act[5] provides that termination of pregnancy after 20 weeks 
may only be performed if a doctor, after consultation with another 
doctor (or a registered midwife who has completed the prescribed 
training course), believes that the continued pregnancy: (i) would 
endanger the woman’s life; (ii) would result in severe malformation 
of the fetus; or (iii) would result in a risk of injury to the fetus. In 
the case of a severely mentally disabled woman or one in a state of 
continuous unconsciousness, the grounds are the same, except for the 
consent provisions, which require that the two medical practitioners 
(or a medical practitioner and a registered midwife who has completed 
the prescribed training course) may consent to her termination of 
pregnancy after consulting her natural guardian, spouse, legal guardian 
or curator. However, the termination of pregnancy may not be denied 
if the persons consulted refuse consent. The grounds in the third 
trimester after 20 weeks of pregnancy are more restrictive than those 
in the 13th - 20th week, i.e.: (i) there is a risk of injury to the woman’s 
mental or physical health; (ii) there is a substantial risk that the fetus 
would suffer from a severe physical or mental abnormality; (iii) the 
pregnancy resulted from rape or incest; or (iv) the continued pregnancy 
would significantly affect the social or economic circumstances of the 
woman. Pregnant children of any age may consent to termination 
of pregnancy without the knowledge or consent of their parents or 
guardians, provided they are able to give an informed consent based 
on the knowledge, appreciation and consent criteria required by the 
common law,[14] and understand the information that must be given 
according to the National Health Act.[15] 
Grounds for termination of pregnancy under the former 
Abortion and Sterilization Act
The former Abortion Act[11] provided that in all instances, 2 doctors 
other than the doctor procuring the abortion had to certify that: 
(i) the continued pregnancy endangered the woman’s life; (ii) the 
continued pregnancy was a serious threat to the woman’s physical 
or mental health and will cause permanent damage; (iii) there was 
a serious risk that the child would suffer a physical or mental defect 
so that he/she would be irreparably seriously handicapped; (iv) the 
fetus has allegedly been conceived as a result of rape or incest; or 
(v) the fetus was conceived in illegitimate intercourse with a woman 
who was, owing to a permanent mental handicap or defect, unable to 
comprehend the consequential implications of or bear the parental 
responsibility for its consequences. Where the pregnancy was alleged 
to have been as a result of rape or incest, a certificate had to be issued 
by the local magistrate who had to investigate the matter and decide, 
on a balance of probabilities, that such an offence had indeed been 
committed. Furthermore, the woman had to submit an affidavit 
stating that the pregnancy was due to the alleged rape or incest.
Are third-trimester restrictions in the Choice on 
Termination of Pregnancy Act unconstitutional?
Under the Abortion Act[12] there were no time limits for when 
abortions on the listed grounds could be procured, i.e. a trimester 
system was not recognised. An abortion could be procured at any 
time, provided the grounds for justifying it were satisfied. During 
the first 20 weeks of the pregnancy the grounds for termination of 
pregnancy in terms of the Abortion Act were stricter than those 
under the Choice Act.[5] However, after the 20th week, the reverse is 
true, because some of the grounds that existed under the Abortion 
Act are not available to pregnant women under the Choice Act once 
the 20th week of pregnancy begins. For instance, under the Abortion 
Act, a termination could be done where there was a serious threat 
to the woman’s physical and mental health or where the fetus was 
conceived as a result of rape or incest. The third-trimester restrictions 
contradict the purpose of the Choice Act, but also violate a pregnant 
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woman’s constitutional right to bodily and psychological integrity 
and access to reproductive healthcare.[12] 
The restrictions in the Choice Act[5] during the third trimester 
place an ‘undue burden’ on women who have been subjected to rape 
or incest and who can only seek assistance to terminate a pregnancy 
after 20 weeks of gestation.[13] The Choice Act places the same burden 
(even if they are not aware of it) on severely mentally disabled 
or unconscious women. Mentally competent women may thus 
experience severe psychological trauma if compelled to carry their 
pregnancies to term. It is also likely to expose children conceived 
by rape or incest to similar trauma should the circumstances of 
their conception become known. Therefore, the limitations to a 
termination of pregnancy after the 20th week of gestation in the 
Choice Act that deny abortions to women who have been subjected 
to rape or incest are unconstitutional.[13] The grounds for termination 
in the third trimester should be expanded to include a serious threat 
to the woman’s physical or mental health and where the fetus has been 
conceived as a result of rape or incest, without the onerous conditions 
that applied under the Abortion Act.[13]
Consulting doctors and midwives may circumvent the Choice 
Act’s[5] third-trimester limitations if the pregnant girl or woman who 
has been raped or subjected to incest threatens suicide or will procure 
a backstreet abortion, as this could justify their being of the opinion 
that the continuing pregnancy would ‘endanger’ the patient’s life. 
Where a pregnant child does not make such threats, the consulting 
healthcare practitioners may still use the constitutional principle of 
the best interests of the child because it is ‘of paramount importance 
in every matter concerning the child’.[2] The Children’s Act[4] provides 
useful guidelines for determining whether the principle of best 
interests should apply to the restrictions in the third trimester of the 
Choice Act.[5] However, these mechanisms are somewhat artificial 
and the Act should be amended to include, as grounds in the third 
trimester, a serious threat to the physical or mental health of the 
pregnant female or that she has been raped or the victim of incest. 
This is because the third-trimester limitations are too restrictive of 
the constitutional right to bodily and psychological integrity and 
reproductive health of girl children and women and also because the 
Choice Act should provide clear guidelines for consulting doctors 
and midwives that are in line with the Constitution. 
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